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The current air traffic concept of operations relies on a centralized process in which 
ground controllers are responsible for determining conflict-free trajectories. However, with 
new technologies such as ADS-B and GPS aircraft could directly interact together to 
resolve their own conflicts in a decentralized manner. The challenge is to guarantee aircraft 
separation while converging to reasonably fair resolutions for all aircraft. The difficulty is 
that aircraft have only limited information about how other aircraft evaluate the cost of 
conflict resolutions. 
Thus, this thesis proposes to frame decentralized conflict resolution using game 
theory. A collaborative decentralized conflict resolution is developed as a sequential 
bargaining process between the different aircraft. At each step, aircraft propose personal 
trajectories to the other aircraft, corresponding to trajectories they would be ready to fly. 
Then they compute response trajectories, corresponding to trajectories they would have to 
fly to avoid the conflict if the other aircraft flew its personal trajectories. If any response 
trajectories are cheaper than the offered personal trajectories, an agreement is reached; 
otherwise, the aircraft need to compromise by offering more expensive personal 
trajectories at the next step. 
Several pairwise conflict experiments, corresponding to different conflict 
geometries, were conducted to explore different ways of handling performance constraints 
and different ways of searching trajectories in the resolution space. Then, the bargaining 
process was demonstrated in a large scale simulation with more than a thousand aircraft 
flying over the Indianapolis Center, incurring more than five hundred conflicts. The traffic 
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sets were taken from real ETMS data over five hours, to represent ‘real’ conditions. 93% 




CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Problem Statement 
The current air traffic concept of operations relies on a centralized process in which 
ground controllers are responsible for determining conflict-free trajectories. However, the 
emergence of new technologies such as ADS-B and GPS affords more autonomous air 
traffic systems, where aircraft could directly interact together to resolve their own conflicts 
in a decentralized manner. 
The real challenge here is to guarantee separation between aircraft while 
distributing the cost of resolutions fairly between the aircraft. However, the difficulty with 
decentralized conflict resolution is that aircraft have only limited information about their 
surrounding traffic, particularly with respect to how the other aircraft evaluate the cost of 
conflict resolutions. Several researchers have proposed decentralized conflict resolution 
algorithms using different approaches, such as prioritizing the conflicting agents [1], 
formulating and solving the conflicts as an optimal control problem [2], using AI 
techniques such as genetic algorithms [3], or a capacitance model representing aircraft as 
charged particles that repel each other [4]. 
This thesis proposes to frame decentralized conflict detection and resolution using 
game theory. A collaborative decentralized conflict resolution is developed as a sequential 
bargaining process between the different aircraft, i.e., the players. The goal of each aircraft 
is to minimize the cost associated with the trajectories that resolve the conflict. However, 
each aircraft doesn’t exactly know the payoff, i.e., the cost function of the other involved 
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aircraft. This is actually the way it is in the real world: airlines prefer not to disclose their 
cost indices, by which they weigh the costs of delay and fuel burn. 
The bargaining problem [5] is a game theory concept that aims at finding an 
equilibrium within a cooperative game. It represents situations in which there is a conflict 
of interest, since players want to follow their own objectives, but could still conclude with 
a mutually beneficial agreement. It is used when cooperation is required for a Pareto-
efficient solution, i.e., one in which it is impossible to make anyone individual better off 
without making at least one other worse off. 
Complicating the problem, performance constraints of the aircraft can limit the set 
of feasible conflict resolutions, and resolutions may be found in multiple dimensions. 
These two issues are framed in this thesis by building a bargaining process with two main 
design variables that explore methods of handling performance constraints and the multiple 
dimensions of the resolution space. 
 
1.2 Objectives 
 Develop a sequential bargaining process for a collaborative decentralized conflict 
resolution where both aircraft simultaneously propose resolutions until an 
agreement is reached, while each aircraft is able to protect its private information 
and account for performance constraints. 
 Run a large scale experiment to assess the efficacy of this process using the multi-




1.3 Overview of the Thesis 
CHAPTER 2 presents the background of the problem of conflict resolution 
addressed in this thesis. The main notions involved in solving conflicts are detailed and the 
different inherent issues that come with it are presented. CHAPTER 3 describes the 
proposed approach and theoretical results used to build the collaborative decentralized 
conflict resolution algorithm. CHAPTER 4 gives an overview of the different 
computational tools and models used to build the simulation engine. CHAPTER 5 presents 
the results provided by the pairwise conflict experiments. CHAPTER 6 shows the output 
and conclusions drawn from the large scale experiment. CHAPTER 7 summarizes the 





CHAPTER 2:  BACKGROUND 
This chapter defines the notion of conflict in an air traffic concept of operations. It 
characterizes decentralized conflict resolution processes and makes a clear distinction 
between decentralized processes and distributed algorithms. It also presents the main 
categories of decentralized processes and identifies relevant concepts in game theory. 
2.1 Conflict Detection and Resolution 
A conflict between two aircraft occurs when aircraft are closer than a given set of 
horizontal and vertical distances. Current en-route air traffic control rules often consider 
these distances to be five nautical miles horizontally and one thousand feet vertically [6] 
for aircraft operating in en-route airspace above 18,000 feet altitude. 
Conflict detection consists in detecting aircraft trajectories in a given time frame 
that will lead to conflicts. Conflict resolution consists in performing changes to the flight 
plans of the aircraft so that conflict-free trajectories are ensured for a given period of time. 
For the conflict resolution to be effective, this period of time, the look-ahead time, must be 
greater than the time frame in which conflicts are detected. This guarantees that the conflict 






2.2 Resolution and Cost 
Conflict resolution provides, in real-time, modified trajectories that maintain safety 
while minimizing cost as calculated for each aircraft according to its cost index. However 
aircraft don’t generally share all the required information to optimize trajectories. Cost 
indices, for example, are kept secret by the airlines as part of their commercial strategies, 
even though they are central in the computation of the cost of a conflict resolution. 
Further difficulties are inherently encountered in the conflict resolution problem 
due to the nonlinearities of the space of potential avoidance trajectories due to the 
performance limits of the aircraft. The common performance limits of aircraft are the range 
of speeds and altitudes in which they could operate, which are defined by the flight 
envelope of each aircraft. For example, the aircraft’s maximum level cruise speed generally 
varies with aircraft weight, which decreases significantly through time as fuel is burnt. Of 
note, the performance limits of one aircraft at any point in time are also not known by 
neighboring aircraft. 
Conflict solutions can lead to new downstream conflicts imposing their own control 
cost. Forecasting and controlling this future control cost, which could be represented by 
the number of maneuvers of future conflicts resolution trajectories and their magnitude, 





2.3 Centralized versus Decentralized Air Traffic Management Systems 
In a centralized air traffic system, one agent, usually a ground controller, has the 
authority to determine the conflict resolution trajectories. This is the strategy adopted in 
the current air traffic system in which communications between aircraft are limited and not 
used actively by aircraft to adapt their trajectories. Ground controllers guarantee separation 
of the aircraft and establish smooth operations within the air traffic system by issuing 
clearances. Figure 1 shows the central role they play: when a conflict situation is detected 
between aircraft A & B, two distinct communication processes are triggered between each 
aircraft and the ground controller. Usually, aircraft just comply with the clearances given 
by the ground controllers and their role in the communication process is simply to read 
them back. The main weakness of such a system is that it relies on a decision maker who 
may have limited information about how each aircraft evaluates cost. 
 
 
FIGURE 1: CENTRALIZED AIR TRAFFIC SYSTEM 
 
In a decentralized air traffic system, aircraft have more autonomy and take part in 
the decision making process to, for example, decide their own strategies and resolutions 
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trajectories in case of conflict. These systems are difficult to implement but have the 
advantage of allowing the main stakeholders to actually be part of the decisions that 
concern themselves. Figure 2 shows a decentralized conflict resolution: aircraft A and B 




FIGURE 2: DECENTRALIZED AIR TRAFFIC SYSTEM 
However, one difficulty to overcome when designing a decentralized system is the 
fact that each aircraft wants to follow its own objectives, which can be antagonistic to those 
of the other aircraft. Aircraft have therefore to make compromises to reach an agreement 
amongst themselves in the decision making process. 
 
 
2.4 Distinction between Decentralized and Distributed 
The difference between centralized and distributed is not important when one 
centralized agent with perfect knowledge of the whole system can get the same outcome 
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as distributed agents who share the same information and value cost the same way. On the 
other hand, truly decentralized systems are characterized by the fact that their outcomes 
are functions of information and cost functions known only by each individual agent, which 
means that centralized agents should not a priori be able to get the same outcome as 
decentralized agents. 
It is interesting to note the potential value of decentralized operations in air traffic 
management. As mentioned above, cost indices are, for example, considered as strategic 
values by the airlines and are kept proprietary. Performance limits are also not known 
centrally. The interest of a decentralized conflict resolution system is then to take 
advantage of the private information that airlines are not willing to share to compute 
avoidance trajectories that are individually considered to be closer to optimal than 
trajectories computed by a centralized agent. 
 
2.5 Main Categories of Decentralized Conflict Resolution Approaches 
Different approaches of decentralized conflict resolution have already been 
discussed in the literature. Two main categories are those based on optimal control, and 
those based on capacitance and particles analogies. 
Approaches based on optimal control formalize the conflict resolution problem as 
trying to minimize a global cost function [2]. The agent responsible for the actual 
computation of the avoidance trajectories would usually be an external agent, such as a 
ground controller, which means that this kind of systems is not truly decentralized. 
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The categories of decentralized conflict resolution algorithms based on capacitance 
and particles analogies consider the aircraft as charged particles with the same sign 
evolving towards their destinations, which are locations represented by fixed particles of 
the opposite sign [4]. Thus, aircraft are repelled by other aircraft and attracted by their 
destinations. This approach allows the use of well-established static charges and 
capacitance theory but has several issues. The first is the difficulty of ensuring that aircraft 
won’t get pushed into the protected airspace of other aircraft. The second is preventing 
resolution trajectories outside of the flight envelopes of the aircraft. 
In [7], Sislak & al. describe an iterative peer-to-peer collision avoidance algorithm, 
called IPPCA, very similar to what is developed in this thesis. It is based on high-level 
flight plan variations using evasion maneuvers. Its default behavior is to minimize the sum 
of the costs of the aircraft, therefore maximizing their social welfare, but it can also be 
configured to provide solutions for self-interested airplanes where airplanes optimize their 
own cost instead of the overall cost. Personal trajectories are successively offered by the 
aircraft without considering the other aircraft proposed personal trajectories, and the 
algorithm stops as soon as a pair of trajectories is found to be conflict-free. However, there 
is no guarantee that, for a fixed personal trajectory in the final conflict-free pair, the other 
trajectory is the cheapest that could have been computed by the other aircraft. 
In [8], Wollkind & al. present an application to air traffic conflict resolution of the 
Monotonic Concession Protocol (MCP) developed by Zlotkin and Rosenschein [9]. This 
approach is also very similar to the one developed in this thesis. The MCP captures the 
incremental bargaining process that takes place between the two aircraft that 
simultaneously make proposals and counter proposals of progressively less value to 
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themselves. In their process, aircraft also pick the trajectories of the other aircraft in their 
successive proposals. These trajectories cannot therefore be guaranteed to minimize the 
other aircraft cost function, since it is not known. 
 
2.6 Game Theory and Bargaining 
Game theory examines strategic decision making in situations involving different 
agents. The objective of game theory is to model these situations to determine the optimal 
strategies for each agent, to predict equilibria of their collective games, and to examine 
whether decisions converge. 
In this work, we are focusing on the development of a collaborative conflict 
resolution algorithm in a pairwise conflict. This is framed as a two-player game where both 
aircraft are trying to find optimal strategies to clear a conflict. The logical strategy that each 
aircraft would prefer would be to not maneuver, leaving the other aircraft to maneuver 
alone. This shows that the problem to solve is essentially a bargaining problem in which 
both aircraft have to compromise to reach an agreement on a conflict’s resolution [5] [10] 
[11] [12]. 
The utility function of a player represents his preference among a set of different 
anticipations. An anticipation of an individual is considered here as a state of expectation 
which may involve the certainty of deterministic contingencies and various probabilities 
of stochastic contingencies [5]. Nash developed a few assumptions to develop the utility 
theory of an individual [5]: 
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- An individual offered two possible anticipations can decide which is preferable or 
that they are equally desirable. 
- The ordering thus produced is transitive; i.e., if 𝐼 is better than 𝐽 and 𝐽 is better than 
𝐾 then 𝐼 is better than 𝐾. 
- Any probability combination of equally desirable states is just as desirable as either. 
- If 𝐼 is better than 𝐽 and 𝐽 is better than 𝐾, then there is a probability combination of 
𝐼 and 𝐾 which is just as desirable as 𝐽. This corresponds to an assumption of 
continuity. 
- If 0 ≤ 𝑝 ≤ 1 and 𝐼 and 𝐽 are equally desirable, then 𝑝𝐼 + (1 − 𝑝)𝐾 and 𝑝𝐽 +
(1 − 𝑝)𝐾 are equally desirable, and 𝐼 may be substituted for 𝐽 in any desirability 
ordering relationship satisfied by 𝐽. 
These assumptions are sufficient to show the existence of a satisfactory utility 
function that assigns a real number to each anticipation of an individual. This function is 
not unique: if 𝑢 is such a function then so also is 𝑘𝑢 + 𝑐, where 𝑘 > 0. Letting capital 
letters represent anticipations, such a utility function will verify the following properties: 
- 𝑢(𝐴) > 𝑢(𝐵) is equivalent to 𝐴 is more desirable than 𝐵. 
- If 0 ≤ 𝑝 ≤ 1 then 𝑢(𝑝𝐴 + (1 − 𝑝)𝐵) = 𝑝𝑢(𝐴) + (1 − 𝑝)𝑢(𝐵). 
This corresponds to the important linearity property of a utility function. 
 
The negative of a cost function 𝑓 can be seen as a utility function 𝑢. For two aircraft 
denoted A and B, we can define 𝑢𝐴(𝑡𝐴) =  −𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴) and 𝑢𝐵(𝑡𝐵) =  −𝑓𝐵(𝑡𝐵). Hence it is 
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equivalent to reason with costs or utilities. The cost viewpoint is used in conflict 
resolutions. 
Formally, a two-person bargaining problem consists of the set of all possible 
anticipations Σ, the feasible set of all attainable costs 𝐹 ⊂ ℝ2, and a disagreement point 
𝑑 ∈ 𝐹 which corresponds to the pair of costs when no agreement is reached. Solving a 
bargaining problem means finding an agreement 𝑠 ∈ 𝐹 viewed as better than 𝑑 for both 
players according to their personal preference, and considered as optimal with respect to 
certain criteria. In the case of conflict resolution, optimal is defined as lowest cost. 
Assuming that players A and B have different preferences, represented by cost 
functions 𝑓𝑎 and 𝑓𝑏, the set of all attainable costs could be written as: 
 𝐹 = {(𝑣𝑎, 𝑣𝑏) ∈ ℝ




The pair (𝐹, 𝑑) represents a bargaining problem. Designing the set of all bargaining 




(𝐹, 𝑑) ⟼ 𝜑(𝐹, 𝑑) = (𝜑𝑎(𝐹, 𝑑), 𝜑𝑏(𝐹, 𝑑)) = 𝑠
 (2) 
 
Two different but complementary approaches have been developed so far to 
construct such bargaining functions. The first approach is strategic: the bargaining process 
is designed first and the properties of its outcome are studied, i.e., the bargaining solution 
is inherently defined by the chosen bargaining process. The second approach is axiomatic: 
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bargaining solutions are characterized by several axioms supposed to be reasonable and 
every function that satisfies these axioms is a bargaining function candidate. 
This second approach led to a major result proved by Nash in 1950 [5]. He showed 
that, in the case where the set of all possible costs is convex and compact, there exists a 
unique bargaining solution that satisfies the following axioms: 
1. Pareto Optimality 
As illustrated in Figure 3, a bargaining solution 𝜑(𝐹, 𝑑) is Pareto optimal 
if, within a set of feasible solutions Σ, there is no other solution 𝑥 that 
simultaneously provides lower costs than 𝜑(𝐹, 𝑑) to both players A and B, i.e. for 
any 𝑥 ∈ Σ, if 𝑓𝑎(𝑥) ≤ 𝜑𝑎(𝐹, 𝑑) then 𝑓𝑏(𝑥) ≥ 𝜑𝑏(𝐹, 𝑑), or if 𝑓𝑏(𝑥) ≤ 𝜑𝑏(𝐹, 𝑑) then 
𝑓𝑎(𝑥) ≥ 𝜑𝑎(𝐹, 𝑑). 
This property simply exposes the fact that with a Pareto non-optimal 
outcome better solutions exist for either or both players. This axiom reduces the 
space of potential bargaining solutions, which should all be located on the Pareto 






FIGURE 3: PARETO FRONTIER ILLUSTRATION 
 
2. Symmetry 
Let the function 𝑇: ℝ2 → ℝ2 be defined by 𝑇((𝑥, 𝑦)) = (𝑦, 𝑥). A 
bargaining solution 𝜑(𝐹, 𝑑) is symmetrical if, for every bargaining 
problem (𝐹, 𝑑) ∈ ℬ, 𝜑(𝑇(𝐹), 𝑇(𝑑)) = 𝑇(𝜑(𝐹, 𝑑)). This basically means that the 







FIGURE 4: ILLUSTRATION OF THE AXIOM OF SYMMETRY 
3. Invariance of Cost with Respect to Affine Transformations 
This property states that an affine transformation of the cost functions 
maintaining the order over the preferences should not modify the bargaining 
solution. This is due to the non-uniqueness of cost functions, as explained earlier. 
If we consider an affine transformation of cost 𝐺 = (𝐺1, 𝐺2): ℝ
2 → ℝ2 such 
that 𝐺((𝑥, 𝑦)) = (𝐺1(𝑥), 𝐺2(𝑦)), with 𝐺𝑖(𝑥) = 𝑐𝑖𝑥 + 𝑑𝑖, 𝑐𝑖 > 0, then for every 
bargaining problem (𝐹, 𝑑) ∈ ℬ, 𝜑(𝐺(𝐹), 𝐺(𝑑)) = 𝐺(𝜑(𝐹, 𝑑)). 
 
4. Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives 
A bargaining solution 𝜑(𝐹, 𝑑) verifies this property if, for 
every (𝐹, 𝑑) and (𝐹′, 𝑑) such that 𝐹′ ⊂ 𝐹, with 𝜑(𝐹, 𝑑) ∈ 𝐹′, i.e. 𝐹′ contains the 
solution of (𝐹, 𝑑), then 𝜑(𝐹′, 𝑑) = 𝜑(𝐹, 𝑑), i.e. the solution of (𝐹’, 𝑑) is the same 
as the solution of (𝐹, 𝑑). The corollary is that removing a subset of 𝐹 not containing 
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the bargaining solution of (𝐹, 𝑑) and therefore considered as irrelevant should leave 
the bargaining solution unchanged. 
 
Nash showed that the unique bargaining solution satisfying the 4 properties 
presented above is defined by: 





(𝑑𝑎 − 𝑣𝑎)(𝑑𝑏 − 𝑣𝑏) 
 
(3) 
Geometrically, the Nash bargaining solution corresponds to the point of the Pareto 
frontier that maximizes the area of the rectangle whose sides are parallel to the axes of the 
costs and opposite vertices are the considered solution and the disagreement point. This is 
depicted in Figure 5. 
 
 
FIGURE 5: NASH BARGAINING SOLUTION 
If the three first axioms have been well received by the scientific community, the 
fourth one has been discussed by several researchers such as Ehud Kalai and Meir 
Smorodinsky [13] who replaced it with another axiom, the axiom of monotonicity, which 
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states that, if  (𝐹, 𝑑) and (𝐹′, 𝑑) are two bargaining problems such that 𝐹′ ⊂ 𝐹, and the 
minimum costs for both players are the same in both problems, then 𝜑(𝐹′, 𝑑) ≥ 𝜑(𝐹, 𝑑). 
This new axiom, associated with the three previous ones, leads to another unique solution 
different from the Nash solution: the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution [13]. Geometrically, this 
solution corresponds to the point of the Pareto frontier located on the diagonal of the 
rectangle with opposite corners that are the disagreement point and the point whose x and 
y coordinates are respectively the minimum costs of each of players B and A. This solution 
is depicted in Figure 6. 
 
 
FIGURE 6: KALAI-SMORODINSKY BARGAINING SOLUTION 
The difficulty is to provide a bargaining process that actually converges to the ideal 
solution through alternative offers. This shows the inherent link between the axiomatic and 
strategic approaches of bargaining. Some works have been developed in this discipline 
such as the Rubinstein bargaining model. Ariel Rubinstein provided a solution to a class of 
bargaining games that feature alternating offers through an infinite time horizon. One 
fundamental idea behind his solution is the fact that delays can themselves incur costs such 
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that payoffs converge to 0 with time and it is always better for the two players to reach an 




CHAPTER 3:  FORMAL DEFINITION OF A BARGAINING 
PROCESS FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION 
Consider a pairwise conflict of two aircraft A & B. If these aircraft remain on their 
initial respective trajectories, they will conflict. The goal is to define a process by which 
aircraft will find new trajectories that resolve the conflict and minimize cost. The aircraft 
also want these trajectories to be fair and they want to keep their confidential information 
private. As discussed in the previous chapter, being “fair” is hard to define. Here, the 
fairness of a conflict resolution is provided by the mutual agreement reached at the end of 
the bargaining process. The aircraft are never forced to accept a resolution, but act 
rationally to minimize their personal cost. This corresponds to a solution to bargaining 
given by a strategic approach, as opposed to an axiomatic approach. However, the fairness 
of the bargaining process can be assessed by examining whether the axioms linked to 
fairness listed in 2.6 are satisfied. In particular, an interesting metrics of fairness is given 
by the axiom of symmetry: the costs of the negotiated trajectories for the two aircraft should 
be relatively close when the conflict situation is symmetrical. 
To interact properly, both aircraft in a conflict must apply the same form of a cost 
function to assess resolution trajectories. Their individual objectives are defined as the 
specific values of the parameters within the function, which can be held private. This 
allows for different evaluations of proposed conflict resolutions by each aircraft and 
represents a truly decentralized process whose outcomes couldn’t have been produced by 
a centralized agent.  
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Formally denoting the space of private information by 𝑋, the space of public 
information by 𝑌, and the space of feasible trajectories by 𝑇 that actually clear the conflict 
situation and respect performance constraints, the evaluation function is: 
 𝑓: 𝑋 × 𝑌 × 𝑇 → ℝ (4) 
 
Assuming aircraft A & B are characterized by knowledge of their local sets of 
information (𝑥𝐴, 𝑦𝐴) ∈ 𝑋 × 𝑌 and (𝑥𝐵, 𝑦𝐵) ∈ 𝑋 × 𝑌, personal evaluation functions could 
be defined by 𝑓𝐴: 𝑇 → ℝ and 𝑓𝐵: 𝑇 → ℝ such that: 
 𝑓𝐴(∙) = 𝑓(𝑥𝐴, 𝑦𝐴,∙) (5) 
 𝑓𝐵(∙) = 𝑓(𝑥𝐵, 𝑦𝐵,∙) (6) 
 
These functions represent the cost of personal resolution trajectories viewed by 
each aircraft, i.e., each aircraft measures its own trajectory cost. Since A does not know 
𝑥𝐵 and B does not know 𝑥𝐴, A has no way to actually compute the cost of trajectories as 
viewed by B and vice versa. 
Starting from a pair of conflicting trajectories (𝑐𝐴, 𝑐𝐵), a reasonable bargaining 
process must find a pair of resolution trajectories (𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵) mutually agreed upon by aircraft 
A and B. The bargaining solution will then be represented in the cost plan by the point of 
coordinates (𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴), 𝑓𝐵(𝑡𝐵)). 
The disagreement point 𝑑 of this bargaining problem will correspond to the 
situation in which both aircraft are maneuvering as if the other one was not wanting to 
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make any maneuvers, i.e., it would correspond to a safe but suboptimal situation. The 
feasibility set 𝐹 corresponds in this problem to the set of all pairs of finite costs 
corresponding to pairs of trajectories that the aircraft can actually fly within their 
performance limits, that clear the conflict, and that are Pareto optimal. 
This chapter defines a bargaining process in which both aircraft will agree upon a 
conflict resolution belonging to the feasibility set 𝐹. In this sequential bargaining process, 
players will be forced at each iteration to always offer alternative solutions they personally 
consider to be worse for themselves than their previous ones. Doing this will force the 
players to reach an agreement after enough negotiations. Delays may be costly but the 
bargaining process is assumed to happen so fast that delays won’t be of any significant 
duration. 
This process is designed so that aircraft can minimize their personal cost functions 
without getting information on the other aircraft’s cost function. In addition, different 
methods for accounting for the performance limits of the aircraft and the multi-
dimensionality of the resolution space are created by introducing two design variables. 
 
3.1 Structure of the Bargaining Process 
The goal is to reach a resolution mutually agreed by both aircraft. The difficulty is 
that both players have a priori no interest in deviating from the simple zero cost solution 
in which they don’t maneuver and their opponent assumes all the cost. To avoid this, the 
proposed bargaining process will force the aircraft to deviate from these trivial but not-fair 
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solutions. A good-faith compliance with this process is assumed, enforced by regulation 
and perhaps built into the on-board automation negotiating for each aircraft. 
The structure of this bargaining process is sequential, as represented in the 
flowchart in  
Figure 7. Hence, each step of the bargaining process is divided into 3 sub-steps: 
1. Each aircraft computes a set of “personal trajectories” in each dimension that it 
would agree to fly with a given cost requirement. These cost requirements are 
initially set to 0 and are increased with each iteration of the process to require 
compromises. 
2. Each aircraft communicates the trajectories computed in 1 to the other aircraft. 
3. Each aircraft computes “response trajectories” as the minimum cost resolution to 
the conflict if the other aircraft flew its personal trajectories. 
4. Each aircraft compares the cost of the set of response trajectories it determined with 
the cost of its own personal trajectories computed in 1. If any of the response 
trajectories are cheaper than the personal trajectories, then an agreement can be 
reached; else no agreement is reached and both aircraft go one step further in the 
bargaining process and loop back to the first sub-step. Both aircraft have to make 
compromises: by increasing their cost requirements, they now have to offer 







FIGURE 7: FLOWCHART OF THE SEQUENTIAL BARGAINING PROCESS 
 
 
The trajectories computed at the sub-step 3 correspond to optimization problems 
subjected to constraints. Each aircraft tries to minimize its personal cost by providing 
trajectories that do not conflict with the trajectories offered by its opponent at the sub-step 
1. Hence, the constraints on this optimization problem are the personal trajectories offered 
by the opponent at the sub-step 1 and the aircraft’s performance constraints. 
With this general architecture of the bargaining process, two important questions 
are raised: how to handle aircraft performance, and how to handle the multidimensionality 
of the resolution space. These questions each can be addressed by different approaches in 
the bargaining process, defined by the design variables described in the next two sections. 
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A third design variable is introduced to understand the impact of the maximum number 
number of iterations of the bargaining process on its convergence. 
3.2 Design Variable 1: Representing Performance Constraints 
The performance limits of the aircraft have a direct impact on the shape of the 
feasibility set. Consider, for example, the feasibility set of the bargaining problem with the 
following shape without performance limits, shown in Figure 8. The disagreement point 




FIGURE 8: COST PLAN WITHOUT PERFORMANCE LIMITS 
In this figure, two areas can be distinguished. The first one, in green, corresponds 
to feasible but irrelevant trajectories because they are Pareto suboptimal with respect to the 
disagreement point. The second area, in blue, corresponds to feasible trajectories which are 
at least better than the disagreement point. 
In contrast, when aircraft are bounded by their performance limits, the feasible set 
will be reduced, as shown in Figure 9. In the worst case, the solutions that are Pareto-
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optimal compared to the disagreement point can be completely cut out, as shown in Figure 
10. Thus, aircraft performance and regulatory constraints can lead to situations in which 




FIGURE 9: COST PLAN WITH RESTRICTIVE PERFORMANCE CONSTRAINTS 




FIGURE 10: COST PLAN WITH MORE RESTRICTIVE PERFORMANCE CONSTRAINTS 




The cost functions and definition of the feasible set can represent performance 
constraints in different ways addressed by the first design variable in this bargaining 
process, as shown in Figure 11. Specifically, the “clipped” method handles performance 
constraints by clipping the feasible set on allowable intervals in each dimension to directly 
constrain the resolution space. The advantage of this method is that it can represent 
precisely the real costs of the allowable trajectories. The cost functions can be computed 
at first, and then the feasible set clipped at the minimum and maximum possible 
resolutions. The potential problem with this approach is that there is no guarantee that 
solutions converge when the feasible set does not meet the axioms assumed in game theory. 
The second “infinite cost” method assigns infinite cost to trajectories that exceed 
performance constraints. The advantage of this method is that good properties of the shape 
of the cost functions can be enforced, such as convexity. However, this method gives 
unrealistically-high costs for resolution trajectories close to the boundaries of the allowable 
part of the resolution space. 
The third “finite cost” method builds a nonlinear mapping that provides real costs 
within the constraints then switches to very high costs when approaching the constraints. 
In this design, the performance constraints are accounted for with finite cost penalties 




FIGURE 11: REPRESENTING PERFORMANCE CONSTRAINTS RELATIVE TO COST 
 
3.3 Design Variable 2: Dimensionality of the Resolution Space 
The space of resolutions represents the space of potential avoidance trajectories to 
clear the conflict. Aircraft have basically six levers of action: 
1. Slow down 
2. Speed up 
3. Turn left 





These levers of action define a multi-dimensional space of resolutions constrained 
by the aircraft performance limits such as the maximum speed they can maintain at any 
given altitude and cruise ceiling. These different degrees of freedom yield a huge resolution 
space that cannot be entirely explored. The design choice made in this thesis is to define 
specific waypoints that correspond to a resolution in each of the different dimensions. 
The second design variable within this bargaining process addresses how to handle 
this multidimensionality of the resolution space. For example, a parallel bargaining process 
might only examine personal and response trajectories that are within the same plane, or 
that are not. In this thesis, each personal or response trajectory will be only in one of the 
six possible dimensions, such that, for example, any aircraft won’t climb and speed up in 
the same trajectory. However, this still provides a large number of possible maneuvers and 
allows for different aircraft in a conflict situation to maneuver in distinct dimensions. The 
number of trajectories computed has a direct impact on the computational effort and on the 
depth of the search of the resolution space. 
The first way to incorporate multiple dimensions of the resolution space is, for each 
aircraft, to compute at the first sub-step six personal trajectories, one per dimension, and to 
communicate them to the other aircraft. Then, in the third sub-step, each aircraft computes 
six response trajectories, each in the same plane as the trajectory it is responding to. Hence, 
during the third sub-step, the costs of six response trajectories are compared with the costs 
of the personal trajectories offered by each aircraft. This corresponds to the situation in 
which every dimension is examined separately with potential pair of resolution trajectories 
each only in the same plane. 
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The second way to incorporate the multiple dimensions of the resolution space is 
for each aircraft to compute at the first sub-step six personal trajectories, one per 
dimension, and to communicate all of them to the other aircraft. Then, in the third sub-step, 
each aircraft computes six response trajectories for each trajectory received. Hence, during 
the third sub-step, thirty-six response trajectories are considered by each aircraft. The 
advantage of this method is that more potential solutions are explored than in 1, such that 
pair of resolution trajectories can be found in different dimensions. However, this requires 
more computational effort. 
 
3.4 Design Variable 3: Convergence 
The convergence mechanism ensures that the bargaining process converges in a 
finite number of steps. This mechanism must enforce compromises by forcing the aircraft 
to always propose personal trajectories that are more expensive than the previous ones. 
After a finite given number of steps, the pair of aircraft should simultaneously be in the 
situation in which they are offering personal trajectories that allows the other aircraft not 
to maneuver at all, if the problem is symmetric. 
This is achieved using constants 𝜆𝑎 > 0 and 𝜆𝑏 > 0 such that, if a personal 
trajectory 𝑡𝐾𝑖 has been proposed at step 𝑖 by aircraft K, with a cost 𝑓𝐾(𝑡𝐾𝑖), then aircraft K 
has to propose a personal trajectory 𝑡𝐾𝑖+1 at step 𝑖 + 1 such that 𝑓𝐾(𝑡𝐾𝑖+1) ≥  𝑓𝐾(𝑡𝐾𝑖) +
𝜆𝐾. Intuitively, aircraft will progressively have to deviate from their initial zero-cost 
proposed personal trajectories to yield to each other. 
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Define the response trajectory for aircraft A to the zero-cost personal trajectory 
initially offered by B as having a cost 𝑐𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝐴 , corresponding to the situation in which A is 
the only aircraft to maneuver, and similarly, the response trajectory for aircraft B to the 
zero-cost personal trajectory initially offered by A as having a cost 𝑐𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝐵 , corresponding to 









, after 𝑛 steps, aircraft A would have to propose a 
personal trajectory with a cost of at least 𝑛𝜆𝐴=𝑐𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝐴  and aircraft B would have to propose 
a personal trajectory with a cost of at least 𝑛𝜆𝐵 = 𝑐𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝐵 . Doing so, an agreement should be 
reached no later than after 𝑛 steps, because each aircraft has to offer personal trajectories 
whose costs are more expensive than the cost of the optimal trajectory it should perform if 
the other aircraft was not maneuvering. 𝑛 corresponds here to the maximum number of 
iterations of the bargaining process and constitutes a third design variable. 
The convergence might break down in the situation in which performance 
constraints are hit in every dimension before the end of the bargaining process. The aircraft 
would be unable to make any further compromises because they could not provide 
trajectories with higher personal costs. In this situation, the aircraft would be stuck at a 
given step and could not proceed to the next one in the bargaining process. 
3.5 Example 
To illustrate this bargaining process, consider a very simplified symmetrical 
situation in which two aircraft A and B are heading towards each other at 400 knots; the 
cost function is the same for both aircraft and corresponds to the extra length flown in the 
resolution trajectories in nautical miles. In this simple example the aircraft are only looking 
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for resolution trajectories in the horizontal plane, and performance constraints are not 
applied. Figure 12 depicts the initial situation. 
 
 
FIGURE 12: INITIAL CONFLICTING TRAJECTORIES IN A SIMPLIFIED EXAMPLE THAT 
ILLUSTRATES THE BARGAINING PROCESS 
 
Step 0.1: 
Each aircraft first proposes to not perform any maneuver, letting the other aircraft 
incur all the cost. This means that they propose personal trajectories (PT) of cost 0 to 
themselves. 
Step 0.2: 
Aircraft communicate the personal trajectories they computed in 0.1. 
Step 0.3: 
B receives the PT proposed by A, with its cost, and B’s response trajectory (RT) 
solves the corresponding optimization problem of computing the trajectory with the lowest 
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possible cost that resolve the conflict with the trajectory proposed by A. The resulting RT 
has a cost of 0.7583 nmi. Likewise, A receives the PT proposed by B, with its cost, and 
computes its own RT as well. The resulting RT has a cost of 0.7574 nmi. (These two values 
should be equal due to the symmetry of the problem; the difference comes from numerical 
errors). 
The two potential resolutions correspond to the following points on the cost plan, 






Unconditionally accepted by B 










Since 0.7574 > 0, A does not accept (0.7574,0), and since 0.7583 > 0, B does 
not accept (0,0.7583). No agreement is reached. At this point, it is known that 𝑐𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝐴 =
0.7574 nmi and that 𝑐𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝐵 = 0.7583 nmi. If we want the process to converge in less than 
𝑛 = 12 steps, we can compute the increased cost requirement for the next PT: 𝜆𝐴 =
 0.0631nmi and 𝜆𝐵 =  0.0632 nmi. 
Step 1: 
B receives the PT proposed by A with cost to A of 0.0631, and computes its own 
RT, which has a cost of 0.3808. A receives the PT proposed by B, with cost to B of 0.0632, 
and computes its own RT, which has a cost of 0.3806. Hence the two potential resolutions 






Unconditionally accepted by B 








FIGURE 14: RESOLUTIONS EXPLORED AFTER STEP 1 
Step 2: 
Proceeding the same way as in the previous steps, B receives the PT proposed by 
A with cost to A of 0.1262, and computes its own RT, which has a cost of 0.2628. A 
receives the PT proposed by B with cost to B of 0.1264, and computes its own RT, which 
has a cost of 0.2626. Hence the two potential resolutions correspond to the following points 






Unconditionally accepted by B 








FIGURE 15: RESOLUTIONS EXPLORED AFTER STEP 2 
 
Again, no agreement is reached here. The bargaining process finally stops at the 3rd 
step and gives two almost identical resolutions. The pair of aircraft can choose randomly 










FIGURE 17: COST PLAN WITH N=12 
 
In the end, all the points of the cost plan explored by the bargaining process in this 
simple situation are depicted in Figure 17. The curve created by these points corresponds 
to the Pareto frontier. The solution found by the bargaining process is fair in that it almost 





FIGURE 18: COST PLAN WITH N = 100 
With 𝑛 = 100 instead of 𝑛 = 12, more points of the cost plan are explored, 
resulting in a higher precision, as depicted in Figure 18. This shows the impact of the choice 
of 𝑛. If it is too low, the final solution found by the bargaining process could cross further 
over the first bisector, impacting the fairness of the process. If it is too high, too many steps 






3.6 Summary: Formal Definition 
Using the constants 𝜆𝐴 and 𝜆𝐵 as described in 3.4, the 𝑖-th step has the following 
sub-steps: 
1. A (resp. B) chooses personal trajectories {𝑡𝐴𝑖
𝑘}𝑘=1..6  (resp. {𝑡𝐵𝑖
𝑘}𝑘=1..6 ) in each of 
the six dimensions with their associated costs {𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴𝑖
𝑘)}𝑘=1..6 (resp. 
{𝑓𝐵(𝑡𝐵𝑖
𝑘)}𝑘=1..6) such that 𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴𝑖
𝑘) ≥ 𝑖𝜆𝐴 (resp. 𝑓𝐵(𝑡𝐵𝑖
𝑘) ≥ 𝑖𝜆𝐵). 
2. A and B exchange their personal trajectories. 
3. A (resp. B) responds to B’s offered personal trajectories (resp. A’s personal 
trajectories) by computing response trajectories {𝑡𝐴𝑟𝑖
𝑘} (resp. {𝑡𝐵𝑟𝑖














Unconditionally accepted by A 





𝑘) ≤  𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴𝑖




𝑘) ≤  𝑓𝐵(𝑡𝐵𝑖
𝑘), B has no reason not to agree with A on selecting 
(𝑡𝐴𝑖
𝑘, 𝑡𝐵𝑟𝑖
𝑘). When both inequalities 𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴𝑟𝑖
𝑘) ≤  𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴𝑖
𝑘)  and 𝑓𝐵(𝑡𝐵𝑟𝑖
𝑘) ≤  𝑓𝐵(𝑡𝐵𝑖
𝑘) are 
verified at the same step 𝑖, the aircraft can arbitrarily select one of the two potential 
resolutions as an agreement. Otherwise, the process moves to the (𝑖 + 1) step. 
Unless prevented by performance constraints bounding the feasible set, {𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴𝑖
𝑘)}𝑖 
is an increasing sequence such that 𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴0
𝑘) = 0 and 𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴𝑛
𝑘) ≥ 𝑛 𝜆𝐴 = 𝑐𝑚𝑎𝑥




𝑘)}𝑖 is a sequence such that 𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴𝑟0
𝑘) = 𝑐𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝐴  and 𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴𝑟𝑛
𝑘) = 0, there will 
automatically exist 𝑖 ∈ ⟦0, 𝑛⟧ such that 𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴𝑟𝑖
𝑘) ≤  𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴𝑖
𝑘). We can reason in the same 
way with B and replace A by B in the previous sentence. This proves the convergence of 
the defined bargaining process as long as the performance constraints do not excessively 







CHAPTER 4:  SIMULATION FRAMEWORK 
WMC, “Work Model that Computes”, is a simulation engine developed at the 
Cognitive Engineering Center at Georgia Tech. This engine permits the analysis of 
complex systems both at a local scale and at a larger system-wide scale.  
The bargaining process described in the previous chapter was implemented by 
developing four core models within WMC. The first one is the outer loop aircraft dynamics 
given by DCRAircraft. The second one is the flight plan cost calculation, responsible for 
assessing the goodness of flight plan for a given aircraft. Then, the third core element is 
the Conflict Detector, essential to detect potential conflicts that need to be solved. Finally, 
the last core element developed is the Conflict Solver, which implements the bargaining 
process.  
4.1 Outer Loop Aircraft Dynamics Model with Flight Plan Following 
An outer loop aircraft model is a simple point-mass dynamics model that uses first-
orders controllers to directly regulate eight states to follow a given trajectory: latitude, 
longitude, altitude, true airspeed, thrust, roll, heading, and flight path angle [15]. It was 
chosen for its relative dynamic simplicity to reduce simulation runtime. A fourth order 
Runge-Kutta adaptive step size integration algorithm (Cash-Karp method) is used to 
integrate the differential equations. Thus it reports its next update time to WMC as the 
current simulation time plus an additional adaptive time step, which is constructed using a 
10−7 fractional error bound. 
Aircraft performance limits are calculated using Eurocontrol’s BADA (Base of 
Aircraft Data) performance models. BADA is a database of aircraft performance values 
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that can be used to model aircraft performance profiles throughout all flight regimes [16]. 
The performance values given for each available aircraft type include thrust, drag, and fuel 
coefficients as well as speeds and maximum altitudes. These values can be used with the 
Total Energy Model (TEM), a reduced point-mass model relating thrust, drag, acceleration, 
velocity, and vertical speed of an aircraft, to create performance profiles. This experiment 
uses the TEM to calculate all performance values from basic principles so as to 
parameterize the outer loop aircraft dynamics models, each according to its aircraft type. 
These values are also used in the flight plan cost calculation: they are used to compute the 
performance constraints of a given aircraft and the rate at which it burns fuel while cruising 
at a given altitude and speed. 
The optimizer sets the initial trajectory of the aircraft to optimality by solving for 
the speed and altitude that minimize the cost of the trajectory. By noticing that optimal 
costs are always reached at maximum speeds, this problem was reduced to a one 
dimensional optimal problem that employs a golden ratio search. 
 
4.2 Flight Plan Cost Calculation 
The flight plan cost calculation examines the fuel burnt and time spent on each leg 
of the trajectory. These values are weighted according to the aircraft’s cost index. The cost 
index is a parameter defined between 0 and 1 that is directly linked to the aircraft preference 
between minimizing fuel burn or delay. 
To evaluate a given flight plan, the fuel burnt and time spent are computed between 
consecutive waypoints, and their weighted sum given by the cost index is stored. A cost 
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index close to 1 corresponds to weighting more delay, whereas a cost index close to 0 
corresponds to weighting more fuel burn. If 𝑑 corresponds to the delay between two 
consecutive waypoints, and 𝑓 corresponds to the fuel burn between these two same 
consecutive waypoints, the flight plan cost 𝑐 established between these two consecutive 
waypoints will be given by: 
𝑐 =  𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡_𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 ∗  𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 ∗  𝑑 +  (1 − 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡_𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥) ∗  𝑓 
The normalization factor is taken from [15] and is here as a bridge allowing the comparison 
between fuel burn and delay. 
To implement the “finite” and “infinite” cost functions described in 3.2, linear and 
hyperbolic terms, i.e., penalty costs, are added when the aircraft is in a range of 30 knots 
of its maximum or minimum speed and in a range of 100 feet of its maximum or minimum 
altitude (arbitrarily set to 17000 feet). These ranges accounts for the situations in which the 
aircraft is flying close to the performance limits. When adding linear terms, flying at the 
performance limits of the aircraft yields an additional finite cost corresponding to the 
“finite” cost function; when adding hyperbolic terms, flying at the performance limits 
yields an additional infinite cost corresponding to the “infinite” cost function. 
The cost index is set arbitrarily and not revealed to the other aircraft. Thus the cost 
functions defined for a given aircraft are personal, and allow only to assess the cost of a 
trajectory for this specific aircraft. Figure 19 shows the cost sensitivities to speed for an 






FIGURE 19: COST VERSUS SPEED AT 25000 FEET WITH A COST INDEX OF 50% FOR 
THE A320 
 
4.3 Conflict Detector 
The conflict detector first projects flight plans as lists of four dimensions waypoints 
into a Cartesian space. The distance between aircraft is evaluated every five seconds along 
their planned trajectories. If the horizontal or vertical separation is not respected, then the 
pair of aircraft is marked as conflicting and the conflict solver is scheduled three hundred 
seconds before the conflict is predicted to happen.  
 
4.4 Conflict Solver 
The conflict solver directly implements the bargaining via sequential notification 
described in CHAPTER 3. If no solution is found, the corresponding conflict is recorded 






















detector is run immediately to check for potential downstream conflicts. The time of closest 
distance between the aircraft is marked down and passed to the conflict solver to create 
additional waypoints for the two conflicting trajectories at that specific time. The resolution 
space is directly explored by shifting these new waypoints in the different dimensions. 
Solutions are then implemented as flight plans with added waypoints. 
 
4.5 Summary 
Four core models were developed in WMC to implement the bargaining process. 
The aircraft dynamics were simulated using an outer loop aircraft model given by 
DCRAircraft. Multiple instances of DCRAircraft can be run together, each of them able to 
follow their personal flight plan. Decentralized conflict detection is simulated by allowing 
aircraft to solve their conflicts with a local detection range corresponding to a look ahead 
time of three hundred seconds. The Conflict Solver directly implements the negotiating 
process detailed in the previous chapter.  
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CHAPTER 5:  PAIRWISE CONFLICT RESOLUTION 
EXPERIMENTS 
This experiment created a set of simulations of only two aircraft (i.e., pairwise 
simulations) that allowed for a full factorial design examining the three design variables in 
a range of conflicts. The following sections detail the experiment design, the metrics used 
to assess the bargaining process, and the results of the experiment. 
5.1 Experiment Design 
This experiment examines the overall performance of the bargaining process, and 
the impact of the three design variables described in 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4. The first design 
variable has three different methods for representing performance constraints in the 
feasible set and cost function. The second design variable corresponds to two different 
ways the multidimensional resolution space is searched, with a full or partial “within plane” 
exploration. The third design variable corresponds to the maximum number of iterations 
of the bargaining process: (𝑛 = 100, 200 or 500). 
A full-factorial experiment design explored the eighteen combinations of these 
design variables in several different conflict conditions. Specifically, these conditions 
included the following. 
Three different geometrical situations: 
In [17], Andrews identified three main classes (or Rules) of horizontal conflict 
geometries that are each best resolved by different types of avoidance maneuvers. One 
conflict geometry per rule was selected to maximize the chances to see the aircraft using 
all the resolution space:  
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1. Rule A: 30 degrees with 0 miss distance. In this situation, aircraft are converging, 
almost following the same route. Andrews identified that the best horizontal 
resolution to this geometry eliminates closure rate. 
2. Rule B: 150 degrees with 0 miss distance: aircraft are crossing. This corresponds 
to the rule B in [17]. Andrews identified here that the best horizontal maneuver to 
this geometry increases the existing miss distance [17]. 
3. 90 degrees with a miss distance of about 4 nautical miles. This corresponds to the 
rule C in [17]. Here, Andrew identified that the best horizontal maneuver to this 
geometry reinforces path crossing [17]. 
 
Three different pairs of cost indices: 
1. 10% and 90%. In this situation, the first aircraft values more the fuel burn than the 
delay, while the second aircraft does the opposite. 
2. 90% and 90%. Here, both aircraft use the same weight between fuel burn and delay, 
and give priority to minimizing the delay. 
3. 10% and 10%. In this final situation, both aircraft use the same weight between fuel 
burn and delay again, but now give priority to minimizing the fuel burn. 
 
Aircraft types: 
1. Both aircraft are of the type Airbus A320 and have the same performance 
constraints. 
2. Aircraft are of different types (A320 and A319) and therefore have different 




In the end, 18 different conflict conditions were making a total of 18x18 = 324 runs 
as shown in Table 1. 
TABLE 1: PAIRWISE CONFLICT RESOLUTION EXPERIMENT DESIGN CONDITIONS 
Independent 
Variable 
 Number of 
Conditions 
1 Design variable for performance constraints 3  
         1.1      Clipped  1 
         1.2      Infinite  1 
         1.3      Finite  1 
2 Design variable for multidimensions 2  
         2.1      In-plane  1 
         2.2      Full space  1 
         3 Design variable for convergence 3  
         3.1      100 iterations  1 
         3.2      200 iterations  1 
         3.3      300 iterations  1 
4 Conflict geometry 3  
         4.1      Rule A  1 
         4.2      Rule B  1 
         4.3      Rule C  1 
5 Cost indices 3  
         5.1      10% and 90%  1 
         5.2      90% and 90%  1 
         5.3      10% and 10%  1 
         6 Aircraft type 2  
         6.2      Same (A320)  1 
         6.3      Different (A320 & A319)  1 
  Total: 324  
   
5.2 Metrics 
For each run, the following metrics were saved: 
 Whether a resolution is found or not. 
 The number of iterations. 
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 The dimensions of the negotiated conflict resolution trajectories. 
 The costs of the negotiated conflict resolution trajectories, using an unmodified cost 
function and if used, any modified cost function accounting for performance 
constraints.  
 The cost difference between the negotiated conflict resolution trajectories of the two 
aircraft. 
 The margins of the final resolution trajectories from the maximum and minimum 
speeds and altitudes. 
 The actual trajectories of the aircraft to examine the significant differences between the 
flight plans of the aircraft and the trajectories they actually flew, and to verify that the 
negotiated trajectories were effectively solving the conflict situation. 
 The total cost of the final agreement point, summed across both aircraft computed using 




A first point to note is that the bargaining process was always successful in the 
sense that it converged in all 324 runs. This also means that the third design variable 
studied, corresponding to the maximum number of iterations, didn’t impact the 
convergence of the bargaining process. 
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5.3.1.2 Impact of the Geometry of the Conflict 
Figure 20 displays the different dimensions of the resolutions selected with the 
different conflict geometries (Rule A, B or C). It is interesting to note that the conflicts 
were usually resolved with maneuvers in the horizontal plane for the conflict geometries 
corresponding to rule B and C, whereas rule A was mostly solved with speed maneuvers, 
and some vertical maneuvers. 
 
FIGURE 20: DIMENSIONS OF RESOLUTION USED FOR THE DIFFERENT CONFLICT 
GEOMETRIES 
 
Rule A corresponds to a conflict angle of 30°, which means that aircraft are roughly 
going in the same direction and that the potential conflict period lasts longer because of a 
small relative velocity between aircraft. Thus, the choice to perform speed maneuvers in 
that situation can be interpreted qualitatively in the sense that this type of maneuvers will 
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of solutions used are different from the ones identified by Andrews for this Rule, as they 
belong to another dimension. In his study, Andrews only looked for horizontal maneuvers 
[17], which means that these maneuvers might be more efficient than the ones he identified. 
Rule B corresponds to a conflict angle of 150°, which is the opposite situation of 
Rule A where aircraft are flying in opposite directions, have a high relative speed, and 
therefore a short period in which they are conflicting. In this situation, horizontal 
maneuvers seem to be costing less to the aircraft than speed maneuvers. The high relative 
speed between aircraft increase the efficiency of horizontal maneuvers as a change of 
direction will have a higher impact on the relative distance between aircraft across time. 
The horizontal maneuvers performed by the aircraft therefore increase the existing miss 
distance as identified by Andrews in [17]. 
Rule C corresponds to a conflict angle of 90° with a miss distance of 4 nautical 
miles. This means that Rule C is close to a no conflict situation because only one nautical 
mile of separation is missing. As for Rule B, horizontal maneuvers seem to be the cheapest 
choice for the aircraft. However, aircraft are not choosing to reinforce the path crossing 
predicted by Andrews [17]. It would have been the case if the aircraft had chosen opposite 
directions to maneuver, i.e., one aircraft going left, towards the other aircraft, while the 
other is going right, towards the first one. Instead, the aircraft systematically chose to 
maneuver in the same direction, both turning left, or both turning right. 
5.3.1.3 Resolution of Symmetric Conflicts 
In cases where aircraft had the same ability to maneuver (i.e., same aircraft type) 
and used the same cost index, and where performance constraints did not impact the 
resolution negotiated by the bargaining process, the global characteristics of the cost plan 
52 
 
seen earlier in the example in section 3.5 were observed again: the Pareto frontier defined 
by the feasible set explored during the bargaining appeared to be convex and symmetrical. 
Figure 21 and Figure 22 show a cost plan and a visualization steps graph corresponding to 
a situation where performance limits were not hit. 
 
 
FIGURE 21: COST PLAN FOR A HORIZONTAL RESOLUTION NOT IMPACTED BY 
PERFORMANCE CONSTRAINTS: RULE C, COST INDICES 10% AND 10%, TYPES A320 & A320, 






FIGURE 22: STEPS VISUALIZATION GRAPH FOR A HORIZONTAL RESOLUTION NOT 
IMPACTED BY PERFORMANCE CONSTRAINTS: RULE C, COST INDICES 10% AND 10%, TYPES 
A320 & A320, CLIPPED FEASIBLE SET, FULL SPACE, N = 500 
 
Figure 22 shows the response trajectory costs as a function of the personal trajectory 
costs, where costs are normalized by the initial response costs. The evolution of the 
response trajectory costs can be seen by reading from left to right as personal trajectory 
costs increase at each step of the bargain. The curves of the response costs of the two 
aircraft are almost confounded, showing the symmetry of the resolution, and are constantly 
decreasing until the agreement is reached when the response trajectory costs get below the 
personal trajectory costs. Geometrically, it corresponds to the point where the curves cross 
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the first bisector of the plane. The assumption that the initial response trajectories costs are 
the maximum costs that could be incurred to the aircraft is verified here. 
 
5.3.1.4 Impact of Asymmetry in the Cost Indices  
Of the three different pairs of cost indices that were tested in the pairwise 
experiments, two pairs were the same (both at 0.1 or both at 0.9); the third created an 
asymmetry in which one aircraft prefers to reduce fuel burn (cost index of 0.1) while the 
other prefers to reduce the delay (cost index of 0.9). Figure 23 shows the cost difference 
between the negotiated resolutions as a function of the different pairs of cost indices. It can 
be observed that the asymmetric cost indices configuration has a significantly higher cost 
in the resolutions it negotiates. 
Figure 24 compares the three costs plans resulting with the three different pairings 
of cost indices. It can be seen that, when identical cost indices are attributed to the aircraft, 
the solutions explored by the bargaining process define symmetrical Pareto frontiers. 
However, when different cost indices are given to the aircraft, the corresponding Pareto 
frontier is dissymmetrical and is located between the two symmetrical Pareto frontiers. 
Cutting the dissymmetrical Pareto frontier at the first bisector shows that it is formed by 
two legs that join the two symmetrical Pareto frontiers. The stars correspond to the costs 
of the negotiated trajectories finally obtained through the bargaining process. It can be seen 
that the resolution point associated with the asymmetrical pairing of cost indices is further 





FIGURE 23: COST DIFFERENCES BETWEEN NEGOTIATED TRAJECTORIES FOR EACH 
PAIRING OF COST INDICES  
 
 
FIGURE 24: COST PLANS OVERLAID FOR EACH PAIRING OF COST INDICES. RULE C, 
TYPES A320 & A320, INFINITE COST FUNCTION, FULL SPACE, N = 500. THE STARS INDICATE 























5.3.2 Design Variable: Maximum Number of Iterations 
The ‘maximum number of iterations’ design variable had no impact on the 
convergence of the bargaining process, since all of the 324 runs converged. However, as 
expected, Figure 25 shows that the average number of iterations required to solve the 
different pairwise conflicts increases linearly with the maximum number of iterations. 
 
FIGURE 25: AVERAGE ACTUAL NUMBER OF ITERATIONS VERSUS MAXIMUM 
NUMBER OF ITERATIONS 
 
The smaller the cost increment is, and the most precise the solution can be. 
However, no substantial gains were achieved by increasing the maximum number of 
iterations, and thus reducing the size of the cost increments of the personal trajectories. 
Figure 26 shows that the costs of the agreement trajectories were approximatively identical 
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the maximum number of iterations yields small enough cost increments and therefore can 
be used for the large scale simulation presented in CHAPTER 6. 
 
FIGURE 26: AVERAGE COSTS OF THE NEGOTIATED TRAJECTORIES FOR BOTH 
AIRCRAFT VERSUS THE MAXIMUM NUMBER OF ITERATIONS 
 
5.3.3 Design Variable: Resolution Dimensionality 
An important result is that the final trajectories given by the bargaining process 
were identical whether it was exploring solutions separately within the 3 dimensions (speed 
changes, horizontal maneuvers, vertical maneuvers), or across all directions, allowing pair 
of negotiated trajectories in different dimensions. 
Thus, the full and partial ‘within-plane’ exploration of the feasible space gave the 
exact same outputs. An immediate consequence is that the computational efficiency of the 
bargaining process can be increased with no loss by only looking for pair of trajectories 
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58 
 
5.3.4 Design Variable: Representing Performance Constraints 
This section presents the overall impact of the performance constraints on the 
bargaining process. Performance constraints only impacted runs where the bargaining 
process explored solutions close enough to the performance limits that penalty costs were 
added when using the finite or infinite cost functions, or that the feasible set was clipped 
such that an aircraft couldn’t offer higher cost personal trajectories. Two different 
situations are presented: where the performance constraints are hit but don’t impact the 
final solution and where they are hit and actually impact the final solution. 
5.3.4.1 Overall Impact 
The performance constraints were handled by either clipping the feasible set, or by 
adding penalty costs with the ‘finite’ and ‘infinite’ cost functions. An intuitive result is that 
the negotiated trajectories calculated using the finite and infinite cost functions have higher 
margins with respect to the performance limits of the aircraft, as shown by Figure 27. 
Another result is the fact that the total cost of the negotiated trajectories (assessed 
using the real, unmodified cost function), was on average lower for the resolutions 
negotiated when performance constraints were represented by clipping the feasible set than 
the ones representing performance constraints with the finite and infinite cost functions, as 
shown by Figure 28. Hence clipping the feasible set yields negotiated trajectories that are 





FIGURE 27: AVERAGE SPEED MARGIN WITH THE PERFORMANCE LIMITS VERSUS 
THE REPRESENTATION OF PERFORMANCE CONSTRAINTS 
 























































5.3.4.2 Performance Constraints Hit at the Beginning of the Bargaining 
A first case is presented in which performance constraints are hit through the 
bargaining process but the final agreement point is far from the performance limits. 
Initially, the bargaining process started by selecting vertical maneuvers. However, these 
trajectories were close to the aircraft’s maximum altitude and, after enough iterations in 
the bargaining process, the aircraft couldn’t offer to go up anymore without hitting the 
constraint. At that point, they switched to feasible trajectories in the horizontal plane far 
from the constraints. 
 
 
FIGURE 29: PERFORMANCE CONSTRAINTS HIT AT THE BEGINNING OF THE 
BARGAINING. RULE B, COST INDICES 10% AND 10%, TYPES A320 & A320, INFINITE COST 





This situation is shown on Figure 29, in a case using the ‘infinite’ cost functions to 
represent performance constraints. With the initial up/down resolutions, additional costs 
were introduced to penalize the proximity to altitude constraints, such that a small change 
in altitude incurred a high cost increment. Therefore, each aircraft could offer a trajectory 
with almost no significant changes that will meet the requirement for increased cost. This 
explains why the sequence of up/down proposed resolutions form nearly vertical and 
horizontal lines in the figure. Once the proposed vertical trajectories grew in cost to have 
the same costs as horizontal trajectories, the negotiation switched to the horizontal 
dimension and the subsequent bargaining follows. 
 
 
FIGURE 30: STEPS VISUALIZATION GRAPH. RULE B, COST INDICES 10% AND 10%, 




Figure 30 shows the response trajectories costs in function of the personal 
trajectories costs in that particular situation where constraints are hit at the beginning of 
the bargaining. Response trajectories costs remain high, at the same level as the initial 
response costs, until aircraft switch to horizontal maneuvers. The assumption that the initial 
response trajectories costs are the maximum costs that could be incurred to the aircraft is 
still verified here even though response costs are not anymore strictly decreasing as 
personal costs increase. 
 
 
FIGURE 31: PERFORMANCE CONSTRAINTS HIT AT THE BEGINNING OF THE 
BARGAINING. RULE B, COST INDICES 10% AND 10%, TYPES A320 & A320, CLIPPED FEASIBLE 




Figure 31 depicts the same situation than before but this time using the ‘clipped’ 
feasible set. The only difference with Figure 29 corresponds to the points located close 
enough to the constraints that their costs differ when using the finite or infinite cost 
functions. The ‘staircase pattern’ that can be observed can be explained by the fact that 
response trajectories are computed by moving along the dimensions by slight geometrical 
increments of finite size. When successive offered trajectories don’t provide large enough 
geometrical shifts, the other aircraft are forced to keep the same response trajectories, until 
there is enough space to gain one geometrical increment. Graphically, this corresponds to 
the gap between successive horizontal lines and vertical lines. 
 
5.3.4.3 Agreement Point on the Boundaries of the Flight Envelope 
A second case is presented here in which the final solution found by the bargaining 
process is located close to the performance limits of the aircraft. In this situation, the cost 





FIGURE 32: FINAL AGREEMENT POINT CLOSE TO THE PERFORMANCE 
CONSTRAINTS. RULE A, COST INDICES 90% AND 90%, TYPES A320 & A320, CLIPPED 




FIGURE 33: STEPS VISUALIZATION GRAPH. RULE A, COST INDICES 90% AND 90%, 
TYPES A320 & A320, CLIPPED FEASIBLE SET. FULL SPACE, N = 200 
 
In Figure 32, depicting the use of the clipped feasible set, aircraft first propose 
speed changes where one accelerates and the other decelerates. However before negotiating 
a solution, one or both aircraft reach their maximum speed and cannot propose to increase 
speed anymore. This means that aircraft can then only offer trajectories in five directions 
instead of six, forcing them to switch to other dimensions with higher costs. It is interesting 
to note that the assumption that the initial response costs are the highest ones is broken 
here: response costs keep increasing through the bargaining process goes, as shown on 
Figure 33. After each iteration, aircraft offer to descend more and more, and since they 
can’t respond by climbing because they are already flying at maximum altitude, they are 
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forced to descend even more: they are ‘pushed down’. Even if the response costs incurred 
are increasing, they appear to be still lower than the response trajectories they could get by 
looking in other directions and that is why they are selected by the bargaining process. The 
cost requirements keep increasing until they finally offer personal trajectories where they 
slow down enough that they could respond by accelerating and exactly solve the conflict 
by flying at maximum speed: they switch back to the speed dimension, but this time, 
offered trajectories correspond to decelerations and response trajectories to accelerations. 
The agreement is reached at that point because at least one aircraft get a response trajectory 
cost lower than its offered trajectories costs but the symmetry of the solution is broken 
here. The cost of aircraft 2 is twice the one received by aircraft 1, even though the conflict 




FIGURE 34: FINAL AGREEMENT POINT CLOSE TO THE PERFORMANCE 
CONSTRAINTS. RULE A, COST INDICES 90% AND 90%, TYPES A320 & A320, INFINITE COST 




FIGURE 35: FINAL AGREEMENT POINT CLOSE TO THE PERFORMANCE 
CONSTRAINTS. RULE A, COST INDICES 90% AND 90%, TYPES A320 & A320, FINITE COST 
FUNCTION. FULL SPACE, N = 200 
 
On Figure 34 and Figure 35, the bargaining process uses respectively ‘infinite’ and 
‘finite’ cost functions to solve the same conflict situation as before. Therefore, proximity 
to performance constraints is now penalized. The resulting cost plans of the bargaining are 
very similar. Aircraft only explore solutions in the speed dimension because they can keep 
offering trajectories by accelerating without reaching their maximum speed. Indeed, 
smaller and smaller velocities increases will keep satisfying the increasing cost 
requirement, and yield almost the same response trajectories as the geometry of the offered 
trajectories remain almost unchanged. An agreement is finally reached when the vertical 
and horizontal lines on the cost plan cross each other. The observed solution costs are close 
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for the two aircraft when using the modified cost function, but not at all when the negotiated 
trajectories are assessed using the real cost function. Indeed, one of the aircraft is almost 
not modifying its trajectory and the other aircraft has to do all the work by decelerating. 
As shown in Figure 36, the speed margin of the solution obtained with the clipped 
feasible set is very low (2.52 knots). The margins obtained with the infinite and finite cost 
functions are much higher, meaning that aircraft stay further away from the performance 
limits, which was expected since constraints are penalized. In terms of performance, 
however, the solution obtained with the clipped feasible set is more efficient than the 
solutions obtained with the finite and infinite cost functions and has a lower total cost, as 
shown in Figure 37. 
 
FIGURE 36: SPEED MARGIN WITH MAXIMUM SPEED VERSUS THE REPRESENTATION 
OF PERFORMANCE CONSTRAINTS. RULE A, COST INDICES 90% AND 90%, TYPES A320 & 































FIGURE 37: TOTAL COST VERSUS THE REPRESENTATION OF PERFORMANCE 
CONSTRAINTS. RULE A, COST INDICES 90% AND 90%, TYPES A320 & A320, FULL SPACE 
EXPLORATION, N = 100 
 
5.3.5 Dependent Variable: Total Cost Analysis 
The total cost of a feasible solution corresponds to the sum of the costs of the 
trajectories it requires of the two aircraft. To assess the efficiency of the bargaining process, 
it is interesting to compare the total cost of the final agreement point to the one that would 
be obtained if only one aircraft was maneuvering, which is common in current conflict 
resolutions selected by centralized air traffic controllers. 
The expected total cost that would have been achieved if one aircraft had been 
chosen randomly to do all the maneuvers corresponds to the mean of the total cost in the 
two initial solutions explored by the bargaining process where aircraft simultaneously offer 
not to maneuver, leaving the other aircraft do all the trajectory modifications. Therefore, 
this expected total cost could be associated with a fictive solution point, corresponding to 




















aircraft is maneuvering, as shown in Figure 38. Solving a conflict situation with the 
bargaining process is, for a global point of view, more efficient than a one aircraft 
maneuvering solution if the total cost of the negotiated trajectories is found to be lower. 
 
FIGURE 38: THE SQUARE INDICATES THE FICTIVE SOLUTION POINT ACHIEVED BY 
THE GROUND CONTROLLER, MEAN OF THE FEASIBLE POINTS EXPLORED AT STEP 0 
DURING THE BARGAININNG PROCESS, WHILE THE STAR INDICATES THE SOLUTION 
ACHIEVED BY THE BARGAINING PROCESS 
As shown in Figure 38, a geometrical sufficient condition for the solution provided 
by the bargaining process to be more efficient than the one aircraft maneuvering solution 
is to obtain a convex Pareto frontier on the cost plan. If the bargaining solution is ‘above’ 
the dashed line that links the initial explored feasible points, then the one aircraft 




FIGURE 39: TOTAL COST COMPARISON ACROSS CONFLICT SCENARIOS USING THE 
CLIPPED FEASIBLE SET 
 
Figure 39 shows that, for about 80% of the runs, the bargaining process was more 
efficient than the random choice of one aircraft doing all the maneuvers. Half of the conflict 
situations where the single aircraft maneuvering solution is more efficient than the 
bargaining solution don’t display any significant difference in total cost. However the 
remaining cases show a strong difference where the one-aircraft-maneuvering solutions 
seem to be much more efficient in terms of total cost. These cases are those where 
performance constraints impact the bargaining process, such as the example case shown in 
Figure 40 in which the bargaining solution converged on a resolution requiring roughly 
twice the cost of either aircraft maneuvering alone. Across all the conflict scenarios, the 
bargaining solution is on average about 16% more efficient than the single aircraft 























































FIGURE 40: EXAMPLE OF CASE FOR WHICH THE SINGLE MANEUVERING AICRAFT 
SOLUTION HAS A LOWER TOTAL COST THAN THE BARGAINING SOLUTION. RULE A, COST 
INDICES 10% AND 10%, TYPES A320 & A320, CLIPPED FEASIBLE SET. FULL SPACE, N = 100 
 
5.4 Summarized Results and Observations 
No resolution was selected in multiple dimensions across all of the 324 runs. This 
is likely to be interpreted as the fact that, when a personal trajectory is offered in a given 
dimension, the space freed in the opposite direction in that same plane allows the other 
aircraft to find lower cost response trajectories in that particular direction. Therefore it is 
sufficient to only look for response trajectories in the same dimension as the personal 
trajectory considered. This means that a partial search of the resolution space leads to the 
same results as the full search where response trajectories are computed in all the 
dimensions. Instead of computing six response trajectories per offered trajectory, only two 
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are considered, increasing the computational efficiency by a factor of three for the exact 
same outcome. 
The representation of performance constraints has a real impact on the bargaining 
solution only when a trajectory lies close enough to the performance limits, meaning that 
the different representations of performance constraints will yield different agreement 
points. In this case, penalizing the constraints by using the finite or infinite cost functions 
for the bargaining process will lead to solutions further away from the performance limits. 
This has one benefit and one drawback: it will yield increased safety margins but will 
provide negotiated trajectories that have, in general, higher total costs than the ones 
obtained using the clipped feasible set. Therefore it could be interesting for the operational 
community to assess the cost of flying too close to the performance limits to define a finely 
tuned penalty cost for the performance constraints. This could be done, for example, by 
trying to quantify the additional costs incurred by ‘flying not safely’. 
Looking at total cost, on average, the bargaining process led to more efficient 
trajectories than single aircraft maneuvering conflict resolutions. However, the conflict 
situations in which the single aircraft maneuvering solutions are more efficient than the 
bargaining solution could be more frequent in real operations. Thus it would be interesting 
to confront this bargaining process with a more realistic situation and make the same 
efficiency analysis. This is the purpose of CHAPTER 6 where a large scale simulation is 
performed. This also allows for the study of additional problems such as downstream 




CHAPTER 6:  LARGE SCALE SIMULATION 
This chapter describes the demonstration of the bargaining process in a large scale 
simulation that represents more ‘realistic’ conditions. Based on the conclusions drawn in 
5.4, the resolution trajectories were only computed in the same dimension as the given 
personal trajectories, drastically improving the computational efficiency of the bargaining 
process. In addition, the performance constraints were represented by clipping the feasible 
set without modifying the cost function. 
 
FIGURE 41: ALL THE TRAJECTORIES COMPUTED DURING THE SIMULATION 
VISUALIZED ON GOOGLE EARTH. THE BOUNDARIES OF THE INDIANAPOLIS CENTER WERE 




This large scale experiment simulated about 1200 aircraft as they fly through the 
Indianapolis Area Control Center. The Indianapolis Center, whose boundaries are depicted 
on Figure 41, is a facility responsible for controlling aircraft en route in the Indianapolis 
Flight Information Region (FIR) at high altitudes. The flight plans and aircraft types have 
been taken from real Enhanced Traffic Management System (ETMS) data over five hours. 
The initial traffic sets were filtered to only keep aircraft whose start and end waypoints 
were above 17000 feet, so that the aircraft could be considered as en route. In addition, 
initial trajectories were optimized to minimize their cost using of the golden ratio 
optimizer, so that any trajectory modification would increase cost. For some unusual types 
of aircraft, this process failed, leading to trajectories that the aircraft were not able to. About 
300 aircraft were filtered out. Finally, 1184 aircraft and associated optimal flight plans 
were defined. 
The conflict detector was used to maintain the list of all the future conflicts that 
would have occurred if nothing was done to solve them. Each conflict resolution was then 
triggered 300 seconds before the conflict and was guaranteeing conflict-free trajectories 
with a look ahead time of 600 seconds. By comparing the list of all the future conflicts 
before and after each resolution, the potential downstream conflicts that could be generated 
were identified and counted. 
The goal of this large scale simulation was not to conduct once more the analysis 
of the different metrics presented in CHAPTER 5 but to gather a little information on 
concerns that arise when more than two aircraft are involved. Specifically, the risk of 
generating downstream conflicts is analyzed, as well as the possibility of getting 
unresolved conflicts. A total cost analysis is also once more conducted. 
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6.1 Overall Performance of the Bargaining Process 
During the simulation, 538 conflicts were detected and a total of 532 were 
successfully solved using the bargaining process designed in this thesis. Examining the 
dimension of the resolution, 43% of the conflicts were solved in the horizontal plane, 47% 
were solved with vertical maneuvers, and about 10 % only were solved using accelerations 
and decelerations. 
Compared to the results of the pairwise conflicts experiments, the fraction of 
conflicts solved with shifts of the cruising altitudes is substantially higher. The pairwise 
conflicts were designed so that the aircraft initial trajectories were always at the same 
altitude. In the large scale experiment however, each aircraft is flying at its optimal altitude 
according to its own performance model. This increases the likelihood that a conflict occurs 
where the two involved aircraft are not flying at the same altitude. Therefore, a smaller 
change of altitudes was often sufficient to resolve the conflict. 
Another interesting fact is that most of the negotiated trajectories were found quite 
far from the performance constraints. About only 4% of the negotiated trajectories were 
found with less than a 50 knots margin from maximum and minimum speeds. On the other 
hand, about 2% only of the negotiated trajectories were found with less than a 100 feet 
margin from the minimum and maximum altitudes. This gives more credit to the 
representation of performance constraints by clipping the feasible set rather than 
consistently needing to apply the finite or infinite cost modifications to drive the 
trajectories away from the performance constraints. 
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6.2 Downstream Conflicts 
The bargaining problem that was designed in this thesis only focuses on solving 
pairwise conflicts. An immediate issue with such an approach is that solving a conflict 
between two aircraft may create subsequent “downstream” conflicts with other aircraft. 
The worst case would be a chain reaction where for example each conflict resolution 
generates 2 or more additional conflicts that will themselves generate even more and more 
conflicts. 
To detect downstream conflicts, the total number of conflicts detected after a given 
conflict resolution was compared to the total number of conflicts that occurred before the 
conflict resolution of the 538 conflicts during the simulation, 11.6% generated downstream 
conflicts. Then, 1.5% generated more than one downstream conflict. 
 
6.3 Unresolved Conflicts 
Examining the six unresolved conflicts, all of them were due to ill conditioning in 
how their trajectories were defined. In some cases, the aircraft trajectories started with the 
aircraft in conflict, and in other cases the aircraft trajectories were required to end as they 
exited the airspace at fixed locations which were so close to the conflict that they limited 
the resolution. General concerns with both of these issues relate to conflicts occurring near 




6.4 Total Cost Analysis 
As previously done in 5.3.4, a total cost analysis compared the total cost of the 
bargaining solution to the total cost if one aircraft was maneuvering alone, as shown in 
Figure 42. The square marks, corresponding to the bargaining solutions are clearly lower 
than the circle marks, showing that bargaining process is more efficient in most cases. On 
average, using the bargaining process induces a 29% total cost reduction. The bargaining 
process appeared to be more efficient about 80% of the time, and only 3% of the conflicts 
were significantly better handled using single aircraft maneuvering, with more than a 10% 
total cost reduction. 
 
FIGURE 42: TOTAL COST COMPARISON ACROSS ALL OCCURING CONFLICTS IN THE 
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6.5 Summary and Observations 
This large scale experiment assessed the performance of the bargaining process in 
a more realistic scenario. It was shown that the negotiating process was able to solve all 
the conflicts that occurred, apart from only six ill-conditioned conflicts, and the resolutions 
were significantly more efficient than single aircraft maneuvering conflict resolutions. 
Since the resolutions only addressed an immediate pairwise conflict, the problem 
of downstream conflicts was analyzed. In this airspace, 10.1% of the resolutions generated 
a single downstream conflict, and a further 1.5% generated two or more downstream 
conflicts. Thus, this method of conflict resolution was – in this scenario – stable in terms 
of reducing the number of conflicts. Of course, other airspace configurations and different 




CHAPTER 7:  CONCLUSION 
7.1 Summary 
Starting from the observation that new technologies such as ADS-B and GPS can 
enable decentralized air traffic of operations designs, this thesis aimed at constructing a 
decentralized conflict resolution as a bargaining process building on game theory. 
The first challenge addressed by this bargaining process is the fact that aircraft are 
not willing to share crucial information required to evaluate the costs of the trajectories. 
For example, aircraft don’t communicate their cost index, which is however central in the 
cost calculation of a resolution trajectory. Thus, this pairwise sequential bargaining process 
was designed so that aircraft negotiate the final trajectories they will fly to avoid the 
conflict. Iteratively, they are required to compromise by offering trajectories of 
progressively greater cost to themselves until they find an agreement. The complexity of 
this design develops from the high dimensionality of the resolution space and the 
performance constraints of the aircraft limiting the feasible set of feasible resolutions. 
The problems of performance constraints and multidimensionality of the resolution 
space were explored by two design variables in the bargaining process. The first design 
variable examined different methods of representing the performance constraints through 
the use of different cost functions or by clipping the feasible set of resolutions. The second 




The pairwise conflicts experiment assessed the impacts of the two design variables 
on the outcome of the bargaining process. The main conclusions were: 
 The negotiated trajectories were always in the same dimensions. Hence a 
partial search of the resolution space for only trajectories that are in the same 
dimensions is enough. This increases the computational efficiency of the 
bargaining process without losing performance. 
 Representing performance constraints by modified cost functions that add 
costs with proximity to the flight envelopes of the aircraft created 
resolutions that are further from these constraints. However the total cost of 
these solutions increased. 
This study was followed by a proof-of-concept experiment: a large scale 
experiment in which more than a thousand aircraft were simulated as they flew over the 
Indianapolis Center. The traffic sets were taken from real data and the performance of the 
aircraft was modelled as realistically as possible. 
The overall performance of the bargaining process in this large scale experiment 
was given along with the analysis of more operational issues including downstream 
conflicts and unresolved conflicts. The main conclusions and observations drawn by this 
demonstration were the following: 
 The bargaining process was quite effective in the sense that all the conflicts 
were resolved except for six ill-conditioned cases. 




 All the dimensions were used for the resolutions, but horizontal and vertical 
maneuvers were in general preferred to speed maneuvers. 
 The comparison with single maneuvering aircraft solutions showed that the 
bargaining was significantly more efficient. 
7.2 Contributions 
This thesis laid down the foundations of a sequential bargaining process to solve 
pairwise conflicts in a decentralized air traffic concept of operations. Different specific 
issues related to conflict resolutions such as the representation of performance constraints 
of the aircraft or the high dimensionality of the resolution space were addressed and studied 
through a series of pairwise conflicts experiments. 
This sequential bargaining process was demonstrated on a fairly realistic simulation 
given its large scale, where data came as much as possible from the real world. This study 
explored operational issues such as downstream conflicts. A comparison with single 
maneuvering aircraft resolutions was performed using total cost metrics, and showed that 
the bargaining process led to a substantial increase of efficiency. 
7.3 Future Work 
Several further aspects of the bargaining process warrant further research. First, the 
representation of performance constraints had significant impacts on the negotiation and 
resulting total cost of the resolution. It could be therefore interesting to refine as much as 
possible these representations. For example, cost barriers could be added only for specific 
performance limits considered to be critical, or tailored to reflect the severity of the 
constraint. Further, the constraints could be expanded to reflect not just the aircraft 
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performance, but also operational factors such as no-fly zones or limits imposed to mitigate 
downstream conflicts. 
Another aspect worth investigating is the game theory optimization of private 
parameters such as cost indices. Let’s consider, for example, two airlines with different 
private parameters settings. Airlines could potentially choose their private information to 
create asymmetries in the negotiations to their benefit. Airlines could therefore try to infuse 
the asymmetry of the conflict situations to get cheaper resolution trajectories. 
The bargaining process was tested in this thesis in a large scale experiment that was 
meant to be closer to reality than simple pairwise conflicts. However, it should also be 
tested in other sorts of airspace and different traffic densities. Such a study could identify 
conditions that might lead to instability in terms of downstream conflicts. 
The bargaining process could also be further optimized to be more computational 
efficient. A smaller number of cost increments, i.e., 𝑛, could for example be assumed at 
the first place, and augmented in case of an overshoot in the solution. A simple checker 
could examine for this overshoot. 
A last interesting point would be to try to bridge the gap between the strategic 
approach that we used to build the bargaining process and the existing axiomatic bargaining 
solutions developed in the literature. Starting from the bargaining process designed in this 
thesis, this would require formal proof that the several axioms listed in 2.6 are verified, at 
least for an identified reduced set of conflicts, and then demonstration that the bargaining 
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